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cover, however, a more faithful interpretation of the language of the Code
would keep cover as a choice, not as an integral determinant of damage
measurement.
Pre-Code law favored a method for calculating damages that could be
applied in all cases. 66 Perhaps this policy of uniformity should also help
determine the direction of post-Code decisions. At interpretation of section
2-713's "learned of the breach" to mean that an aggrieved buyer who does
not cover would also "learn" of the breach at the end of the same time
period he would have had to procure cover would serve a dual purpose. It
would reconcile section 2-713 with the basic policy of allowing a buyer a
"commercially reasonable time" before taking any action and, in contrast
to Cargill, would be more likely to yield the same amount in damages as
when the buyer covered. In this way, the courts would be upholding an
important traditional purpose of damage measurements while resting their
decisions on Code considerations and policies.
CARLYN GRAU POOLE
Criminal Law-Polygraph Examination Results Admissible in
Post-Conviction Hearings
Despite the widespread use of and reliance upon the polygraph or "lie
detector"' in nonjudicial and pretrial investigations, 2 courts have regarded
the polygraph with suspicion. Polygraph examination results have been
barred from most courts in the United States3 on the ground that such
66. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
1. The polygraph, commonly called a "lie detector," is designed to monitor and measure
certain physiological responses of a person who is answering a set of "yes" or "no" questions.
The device consists of three basic parts: (1) a "pneumograph tube" which is fastened around
the subject's chest to record respiration; (2) a blood pressure cuff to record pulse and blood
pressure; and (3) electrodes fastened to the hands or fingers through which an imperceptible
electric current passes in order to record galvanic skin response. The instrument produces an
electromechanical recording of unconscious physiological changes theoretically produced by
internal stress caused by an examinee's conscious insincerity. The polygraph examiner's expert
opinion regarding his examinee's sincerity is based on his analysis of the recording and other
circumstances of the examination. See generally 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 999 (J. Chad-
bourn rev. 1970 & Supps. 1975 & 1977).
2. See, e.g., People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 313, 235 N.W.2d 581, 584-85 (1975)
(Michigan Supreme Court took judicial notice of investigative usefulness of polygraph).
3. E.g., Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929
(1959); People v. York, 174 Cal. App. 2d 305, 344 P.2d 811 (1959). But see United States v.
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evidence has not gained "general scientific acceptance," 4 the traditional
test for admission of such evidence originally set forth in Frye v. United
States.' Michigan has joined the majority of jurisdictions in barring poly-
graph evidence from use at trial. 6 In a case of first impression, however, the
Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Barbara7 held that, in ruling on a
post-conviction motion for a new trial, the judge may in his or her discretion
weigh the results of a polygraph examination.8
Movant Joseph Barbara, Jr., was accused of having extorted money
from Delores Lazaros by threatening the lives of her son and imprisoned
husband. 9 In fear of movant's threats, Lazaros informed no one of the
incident until her husband, Peter Lazaros, returned from prison.' 1 The
authorities were informed at that time and, following testimony at the trial
by both Peter and Delores Lazaros, Barbara was convicted.
11
Following a number of unsuccessful appeals, 12 Barbara moved for a
new trial, asserting that newly discovered evidence showed that Peter
Lazaros had given perjured testimony.13 Movant offered two new witnesses
and testimony regarding the results of polygraph examinations passed by
one of the two new witnesses;' 4 although the trial court barred the polygraph
Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (rejected nonadmissibility); Commonwealth v. A
Juvenile (No. 1), 365 Mass. 421,313 N.E.2d 120 (1974) (special exception made when defendant
agrees in advance to take a polygraph test and submit the tests irrespective of results).
4. See text accompanying notes 27-29 infra.
5. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
6. As recently as 1968, the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Frechette, 380 Mich.
64, 155 N.W.2d 830 (1968), reaffirmed its opposition to the use of polygraph evidence at trial,
stating, "There can be no doubt at present that in this jurisdiction the results of lie detector tests
are inadmissible." Id. at 68, 155 N.W.2d at 832.
7. 400 Mich. 352, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977).
8. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 197-98.
9. Id. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 173.
10. Delores Lazaros alleged that while her husband was imprisoned, movant came to her
home, raped her and extorted money from her. Id.
11. Id.
12. Barbara's initial appeal asserted that the behavior of witnesses Peter and Delores
Lazaros in injecting extraneous and prejudicial matters into their testimony in the presence of
the jury deprived movant of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The Michigan Court of
Appeals rejected Barbara's claim on appeal, 23 Mich. App. 540, 179 N.W.2d 105 (1970), and the
Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, 383 Mich. 803 (1970). The United States
District Court granted movant's writ of habeas corpus, see 400 Mich. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 173,
but was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Barbara v. Johnson, 449 F.2d
1235 (6th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972).
13. 400 Mich. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 173.
14. One of Barbara's new witnesses, a cousin of Peter Lazaros, testified that Lazaros told
him his wife was not raped and that Lazaros admitted making up the story to get out of prison.
The witness had successfully taken a polygraph examination. He came forward with his
testimony after he learned that movant had been sentenced to a long prison term. Id. at-, 255
N.W.2d at 173-74.:
19781
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evidence it "permitted a special record of the tests to be made.' 5 Barbara's
motion for a new trial was denied' 6 on the grounds that Michigan law
prevented the admission into evidence of polygraph examination results in a
post-conviction proceeding and that the testimony did not constitute newly
discovered evidence sufficient to warrant a new trial.1
7
On appeal 18 the Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed its view that
polygraph evidence is inadmissible at trial, 19 but rejected the trial judge's
assumption that he had no discretion to consider the polygraph evidence in a
post-conviction motion for a new trial, even if he was satisfied with the
reliability of the polygraph machine and the proficiency of the polygraph
operator.2" The court reasoned that such discretion was permissible because
a motion for a new trial requires lesser standards of proof than a trial itself.
21
15. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 174.
16. The hearing judge conceded that Peter Lazaros' cousin's testimony discredited the
testimony of Peter Lazaros, but concluded that it did not discredit the testimony of the
complainant, Delores Lazaros. The court attributed Barbara's conviction to the complainant's
testimony, as the alleged offense took place while Peter Lazaros was in prison, and concluded
that the new evidence was not sufficient to render a different result probable on retrial. Id.
The discovery that testimony introduced at trial was perjured, however, may be grounds
for ordering a new trial in Michigan. Id. Barbara contended that the polygraph results he
offered would have facilitated his demonstration, and the hearing judge's determination, that
Peter Lazaros committed perjury. Specifically, if the jury would believe his new witness, then
the credibility of both Peter and Delores Lazaros would be impeached. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at
174-75. In this context it should be noted that when newly discovered evidence is positive as to
the accused's innocence, the technical rules of evidence may be relaxed. See, e.g., State v.
Jones, 89 S.C. 41, 44, 71 S.E. 291, 292 (1911); State v. Laper, 26 S.D. 151, 157-58, 128 N.W.
476, 479 (1910).
Although movant offered the result of his own favorable polygraph examination, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that the offer was merely duplicative of Barbara's denial of guilt
and, therefore, not new evidence. 400 Mich. at - n.2. 255 N.W.2d at 175 n.2.
17. 400 Mich. at -, -, 255 N.W.2d at 174, 199. The purpose of a post-conviction hearing
for a new trial based on newly found evidence is, as its name suggests, an action to determine
whether, in the interests of justice, new evidence is of sufficient importance to entitle a party to
a new trial. Four basic requirements must be met before a court will grant a new trial because of
newly discovered evidence. Movant must show that: (1) The evidence itself, not merely its
materiality, is newly discovered; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) the evidence is such as
to render a different result probable on a retrial of the cause; and (4) the party could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at trial. People v. Clark, 363 Mich. 643,
647, 110 N.W.2d 638, 640 (1961).
18. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Barbara leave to appeal, but the Michigan
Supreme Court granted leave. No. 15815 (Mich. Ct. App., docketed March 23, 1973), appeal
granted, 391 Mich. 761 (1974).
19. The Barbara court cited two reasons for its refusal to reject the Frye rule: (1) The
field of polygraphy is still challenged forcefully on theoretical grounds; and (2) the results of
polygraphy have yet to achieve a predictable level of consistency among examiners, despite
significant progress in recent years. 400 Mich. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 186 (citing Commonwealth
v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 365 Mass. 421, 429, 313 N.E.2d 120, 125 (1974)).
20. Id. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 199.
21. Justice Coleman, in his dissenting opinion, contended that the majority's "argument
that a motion for a new trial requires lesser standards of proof than a trial itself and, therefore,
we should experiment with an admittedly unreliable source of evidence, is unpersuasive." Id.
at -, 255 N.W.2d at 202 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
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Characterizing a new trial hearing as a "preliminary procedure" in which a
defendant's guilt or innocence is not at issue,22 the Barbara court noted that
a judge may use certain data, such as affidavits, which would be inadmis-
sible at trial, to assist in rendering his decision.
23
The Barbara court then held that judges hearing post-conviction mo-
tions for new trials may in their discretion consider the results of polygraph
examinations provided that the results of the test are offered on the defend-
ant's behalf, the test was taken voluntarily, the examiner's qualifications,
the quality of the equipment and the procedures employed are approved, the
test results are considered only with regard to the general credibility of the
new witness, and all knowledge of the test is barred from the trier of fact in a
new trial. 24 The court emphasized that its limitations on the permissible use
of the polygraph in court kept its holding "well within the limits prescribed
by the state of the art" and avoided "prematurely considering those policy
questions which inevitably accompany use of such evidence at trial. "25 A
two-fold advantage to limited admission of polygraph evidence was ac-
knowledged by the Barbara court. The test results could assist the defend-
ant in demonstrating, and the judge in determining, that a newly discovered
witness is credible without casting the polygraph in a decisive role. In
addition, the courts would have the opportunity to establish a "track re-
cord" of polygraph reliability under strictly controlled conditions.
26
The historical roots of Barbara can be traced back to Frye v. United
States,27 which marked the first attempt to introduce polygraph evidence in
court. In that case defendant sought to introduce an expert to testify at trial
about the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test, 28 a forerunner to
the modem polygraph. In excluding the evidence, the Frye court said:
22. Id. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 197.
23. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 199. The court conceded, though, that "experimentation
would be unwise when an individual's life or freedom might hinge directly on the effect at trial
of a questionable device." Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 198.
24. Id. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 197-98.
25. Id. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 198.
26. Id. One of the strongest contentions against the admission of polygraph evidence has
been its scientifically unsubstantiated reliability. See Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific
Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 (1961). For a thorough discussion of
case law and scientific information concluding that the polygraph is highly accurate, see Note,
The Emergence of the Polygraph at Trial, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1120 (1973).
27. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28. A systolic blood pressure deception test simply recorded blood pressure and pulse.
The modem polygraph records not only blood pressure and pulse but also respiration and
galvanic skin reflex or electrodermal response. See J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION:
THE POLYGRAPH ("LIE-DETEcrOR") TECHNIQUE 1-3 (1966).
1978]
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Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
29
Academic criticism has since been leveled against the Frye standard of
general scientific acceptance on the ground that it is an unnecessarily strict
test for the admission of scientific evidence, amounting in effect to a
rigorous rule of judicial notice. 30 Frye, however, has long been adhered to
by the great majority of jurisdictions, and remains today the leading case on
the subject.31 The Frye standard was first enunciated in Michigan in People
29. 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
30. An expert witness offering scientific testimony usually applies a general scientific
principle (conscious deception causes internal stress which, in turn, produces unconscious
physiological changes) to specific data or evidence (abnormal blood pressure, respiration or
galvanic skin response) in an effort to reach a conclusion relevant to the issues of the particular
case (witness credibility). The validity of the principle underlying the technique may be so
widely accepted, as in handwriting analysis, fingerprinting and ballistics, that judicial notice of
it will be taken by a court without the necessity of establishing a foundation through expert
testimony. See United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 94 (1972); Tarlow, Admissibility of
Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining Credibility In a Perjury-Plagued System, 26
HASTINGS L. REV. 917, 941 (1975). Although critics of the Frye rule concede that the general
acceptance standard is appropriate for taking judicial notice of scientific assertions, they do
note believe it is a proper standard for gauging the admission of scientific evidence. "Any
relevant conclusions [from scientific evidence] which are supported by a qualified expert
witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion." MCCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 9. See also Kaplan, The Lie Detector: An Analysis of its Place in
the Law of Evidence, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 381, 386 (1964).
31. See MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 207, at 506. Although Frye has been followed in the
vast majority of jurisdictions, the Barbara court cited two federal cases and one state case that
have called the Frye rule into question: United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970) (sub silentio substitution of a different rule for Frye);
United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (substitution of a more lenient test
than Frye); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 365 Mass. 421,313 N.E.2d 120 (1974) (special
exception to the Frye rule created when defendant agrees in advance to take a polygraph test
and submit the tests irrespective of results). The Barbara court called these cases
"anomalies." 400 Mich. at-, 255 N.W.2d at 186; cf. People v. McLaughlin, 3 Mich. App. 391,
393, 142 N.W.2d 484, 485 (1966) (fact of polygraph examination admissible at trial without
objection).
Although no appellate court has specifically rejected Frye, in United States v. Ridling,
350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972), the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
rejected the Frye court's conclusion. The Ridling court declared that the scientific basis for the
polygraph examination was well established and directly relevant to that case (a perjury case).
Id. at 93, 95.
The complete requirements established by the Ridling court for the admission of polygraph
evidence in trials are:
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v. Becker.32 The Becker court held that the admissibility of polygraph
evidence would be contigent upon "testimony offered which would indicate
that there is at this time a general scientific recognition of such tests."
'33
Michigan courts have relied on the Becker/Frye holdings and the subsequent
failure of the polygraph to gain general scientific approval in barring the
admission of polygraph evidence in most judicial contexts. 34 Although
courts in other states have allowed opposing parties to stipulate before the
test is administered that the results could be admitted into evidence,35 the
courts in Michigan have denied this option.3 6 Given Michigan's historical
intolerance for use of polygraph evidence in almost any judicial context, the
impact of the supreme court's decision in Barbara in favor of limited
admission of such evidence becomes all the more significant.
Prior to Barbara, the Michigan courts had twice confronted the issue
whether polygraph evidence could be used to aid in the evaluation of witness
credibility in a new trial hearing. 37 In both cases the Michigan Court of
Appeals relied on the Becker/Frye rule in denying the admission of such
1. The parties will meet and will recommend to the Court three competent polygraph
experts other than those offered by the defendant. 2. The Court will appoint one or
more of the experts to conduct a polygraph examination. 3. The defendant will
submit himself for such examination at an appointed time. 4. The expert appointed
by the Court will conduct the examination and report the results to the Court and to the
counsel for both the defendant and the government. 5. If the results show, in the
opinion of the expert, either that the defendant was telling the truth or that he was not
telling the truth on the issues directly involved in this case, the testimony of the
defendant's experts and the Court's expert will be admitted. 6. If the tests indicate
that the examiner cannot determine whether the defendant is or is not telling the truth,
none of the polygraph evidence will be admitted.
Id. at 99.
32. 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942).
33. Id.; accord, People v. Frechette, 380 Mich. 64, 68, 155 N.W.2d 830, 832 (1968);
People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 370, 72 N.W.2d 269, 281 (1955).
34. Results of polygraph examination or any reference to them are inadmissible evidence
in: (1) Competency hearings, People v. Liddell, 63 Mich. App. 491, 495, 234 N.W.2d 669, 672
(1975); (2) presentence reports, People v. Allen, 49 Mich. App. 148, 152, 211 N.W.2d 533, 535
(1973); (3) sentencing proceedings, People v. Towns, 69 Mich. App. 475,478,245 N.W.2d 97, 99
(1976); and (4) civil proceedings, Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 610, 50 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1951).
35. See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); People v. Houser, 85 Cal.
App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948); State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 1334, 125 N.W.2d 825 (1964);
State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216
N.W.2d 8 (1974).
36. Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951); People v. Levelston, 54 Mich.
App. 477, 221 N.W.2d 235 (1974).
37. People v. Alexander, 72 Mich. App. 91,249 N.W.2d 307 (1976); People v. Sinclair, 21
Mich. App. 255, 175 N.W.2d 893 (1970). The court in Barbara also cited two cases from other
jurisdictions, United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), and State v. Scott,
210 Kan. 426, 502 P.2d 753 (1972), in which the issue whether polygraph evidence could be used
to buttress the credibility of the defendant in a new trial hearing had been considered. 400 Mich.
at - n.45, 255 N.W.2d at 197-98 n.45. Both courts denied the admissibilityof such evidence on
the ground that it was merely cumulative and inadmissible at trial. 179 F. Supp. at 280; 210 Kan.
at 434, 502 P.2d at 760.
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evidence. In People v. Sinclair,38 defendant, following his conviction for
armed robbery, moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence
after an inmate at a state prison signed an affidavit stating that he, and not
defendant, had committed the crime in question. 39 A police administered
polygraph test indicated that the affiant's confession was a fabrication.
4 0
Statements by the judge hearing defendant's motion revealed that he gave
weight to the test results in denying Sinclair's motion for a new trial. 41 The
court of appeals, citing Becker, held that it was error to admit or to consider
the test results in the hearing for a new trial and remanded for rehearing.
42
The Sinclair court, unlike the Barbara court, failed to note any procedural
differences between a trial and a hearing following a motion for a new trial
that might warrant distinguishing Sinclair from previous decisions on the
polygraph.
Defendant in People v. Alexander43 was convicted of armed robbery
and moved for a new trial based on newly found evidence. 44 In support of
his motion, defendant offered two new witnesses and was prepared to offer
polygraph evidence presumably supporting his innocence. 45 The hearing
judge refused to admit testimony that would lay a foundation for the
admission of the polygraph examination results and subsequently denied
defendant's motion for a new trial.46 The court of appeals affirmed and,
deferring to the supreme court's pending decision in Barbara, said, "Until
changed by the Supreme Court polygraph results are inadmissible." 47 If
defendant's test results were offered to buttress the credibility of at least one
of the new witnesses, 48 then Barbara overrules sub silentio the court of
38. 21 Mich. App. 255, 175 N.W.2d 893 (1970).
39. Id. at 256, 175 N.W.2d at 894.
40. Id. at 257, 175 N.W.2d at 894.
41. The trial court made the following remark in the new trial hearing:
"They did put Mr. Todd on a polygraph to determine whether or not there was any
substance to his story. Although the results of a polygraph are not admissible in a
proceeding in court, nevertheless, it was the conclusion of the polygraph operator and
the police that this was a fabrication on the part of Mr. Todd merely to wipe off an
offense for Defendant Sinclair."
Id. (quoting trial court).
42. Id. at 258, 175 N.W.2d at 894-95 (citing People v. Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d
503 (1942)).
43. 72 Mich. App. 91, 249 N.W.2d 307 (1976).
44. Id. at 97, 249 N.W.2d at 308. Alexander's newly found evidence consisted in part of a
new witness, a friend of defendant, who allegedly knew who committed the robbery for which
Alexander was convicted. Id. at 93-94, 249 N.W.2d at 308-09.
45. Id. at 97, 249 N.W.2d at 309-10. It is unclear from the court's opinion in Alexander
whether the polygraph test results were offered to support the testimony of defendant, of the
new witnesses, or of both.
46. Id. at 97, 249 N.W.2d at 310.
47. Id.
48. If the polygraph evidence was offered only to buttress defendant's own credibility,
that evidence was cumulative under the court's opinion in Barbara. See note 16 supra.
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appeals' holding in Alexander.49
The Barbara decision constitutes a limited victory for advocates of a
more liberal rule for the admission of polygraph evidence. The Michigan
Supreme Court, in deciding Barbara, apparently reassessed the counter-
balancing factors traditionally advanced for excluding polygraph evidence at
trial. Few critics of the polygraph today would contend that the opinion of a
qualified polygraph expert has no probative value in assessing the sincerity
of his examinee.5 0 Even prior to Barbara the Michigan Supreme Court went
so far as to take judicial notice of the fact that the polygraph is a useful
investigative device. 5 ' In the past, however, the probative value of the
polygraph has been outweighed by judicial fear of the prejudicial effect of
such evidence upon the trier of a defendant's guilt or innocence.12 Because
of the polygraph's misleading reputation as a "truth teller," courts have
demanded that the opinion of a polygraph expert be almost infallible be-
cause the trier of fact will invariably think it so. 53 By barring the results of a
polygraph examination from the trier of fact in a new trial, and by strictly
limiting the admission of such evidence to new trial hearings in which new
witness credibility is a central issue, Barbara minimizes the prejudicial
effect of polygraph evidence while maximizing its probative value. Relevant
evidence is presumably yielded through admission of polygraph evidence in
this judicial. context. The question remains, however, whether the probative
value of the polygraph, even without its prejudicial effect on the jury, is still
sufficient to warrant the time-consuming procedures mandated for court-
approved admissibility.54
49. Barbara does not overrule the court of appeals decision in Sinclair because the
polygraph evidence in the new trial hearing was unfavorable to defendant. See text accompany-
ing note 24 supra.
50. See MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 207, at 507.
51. People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 313, 235 N.W.2d 581, 584-85 (1975).
52. MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 207, at 507; see, e.g., United States v. Stromberg, 179 F.
Supp. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (admission of polygraph evidence at trial would be tantamount
to overturning the jury system); People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 372,72 N.W.2d 269, 282 (1955)
("The tremendous weight which such tests would necessarily carry in the minds of a jury
requires us to be most careful regarding their admission into evidence and we should not do so
before its accuracy and general scientific acceptance and standardization are clearly shown.");
People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511,'518, 255 N.E.2d 696, 700, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430,435 (1969) ("We
are all aware of the tremendous weight which such tests would necessarily have in the minds of
a jury.").
53. MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 207, at 507. Courts in Michigan had.likewise barred the
results of polygraph examinations from new trial hearings because of the presumed prejudicial
effect of such tests on the judge. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 49 Mich. App. 148, 211 N.W.2d 533
(1973); People v. Sinclair, 21 Mich. App. 255, 175 N.W.2d 893 (1970); cf. People v. Towns, 69
Mich. App. 475, 245 N.W.2d 97 (1976) (error for sentencing judge to have knowledge of
polygraph examination results).
54. To lay a proper foundation for the admission of polygraph evidence in a new trial
hearing in accordance with the Barbara court's requirements, the polygraph examiner, his
1978]
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Barbara constitutes a new limitation on the scope of the Frye rule in
Michigan. Although the court reaffirmed its support of Becker/Frye with
respect to the admission of polygraph evidence at trial,55 the exclusionary
barrier of general scientific acceptance first raised in Frye was not applied
with respect to new trial hearings. Demonstrated probative value, as op-
posed to demonstrated scientific approval, now appears to be the standard
for the admission of polygraph evidence in Michigan new trial hearings
based on newly found evidence. 56 Barbara is itself a conservative refine-
ment of the holdings of those few courts that have admitted polygraph
evidence at trial.57 While the polygraph's usefulness in gauging witness
credibility is employed in such cases, Barbara's implementation alone
succeeds in eliminating the instrument's prejudicial effect on the jury.
The new trial hearing has been designated the appropriate judicial
"lab" for testing the polygraph's reliability, 5 but the Barbara court's
characterization of the new trial hearing as a preliminary procedure is
misleading. While such a hearing may be merely a proceeding preliminary
to trial, it may also, in effect, be the defendant's final attack on the
conviction. The judge ultimately determines whether the new trial hearing is
a preliminary or final proceeding because he is the trier of the sufficiency of
the evidence59 and is not himself shielded from the prejudicial effect of the
test results. The Barbara court implicitly recognized this problem by
limiting the admissibility of polygraph evidence to test results favorable to
the defendant.' One can only speculate what effect a defendant's omission
in providing such test results will now have on the hearing judge's discretion
to grant or to deny a motion for new trial. 6'
equipment and the procedures employed must be approved by the court. Furthermore, the
examinee may be subjected to a second, and conceivably a third, polygraph test upon the
request of the prosecutor or the court. 400 Mich. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 197-98. These procedures
may be too involved to provide a conclusion the judge could make on the basis of his own
powers of observation. See United States v. Urquidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363, 1365-67 (C.D. Cal.
1973). But cf. Tarlow, supra note 30, at 958 (the objection that admission of polygraph evidence
would require prolonged adjudication in each case is a "minor" one).
55. 400 Mich. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 186; see note 19 and accompanying text supra.
56. Cf. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 687-88 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Frye has been interpreted to demand general acceptance among the experts
that current polygraph techniques possess a degree of reliability which satisfies the court of its
probative value."); Tarlow, supra note 30, at 945-46 (the interpretation of Frye's "general
acceptance" as "reliable enough to have probative value" would appear close to the traditional
standard for the admission of scientific evidence).
57. See note 31 supra.
58. 400 Mich. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 198-99; see text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
59. See, e.g., People v. Sinclair, 21 Mich. App. at 258, 175 N.W.2d at 895.
60. 400 Mich. at -, 255 N.W.2d at 198; see text accompanying note 24 supra.
61. New trial hearing judges in Michigan may now come to expect defendants to submit
polygraph examination results with their new witnesses Failure to provide such results may
improperly influence the judge in the same manner as the judge's knowledge of a defendant's
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UNION ELECTIONS
Permitting limited admission of polygraph evidence in a hearing upon a
motion for new trial is a novel compromise between the strict evidentiary
standard of general scientific acceptance and the liberal rules of relevant
evidence. Barbara preserves the sanctity of the trial from a "questionable
device," but permits the court to test the utility of the polygraph under
strictly controlled conditions. If the polygraph fails to demonstrate its
reliability in gauging witness sincerity within the confines of new trial
hearings, the Barbara court has limited adequately the effect of its decision
through the numerous conditions imposed on the permissible use and pur-
pose of such evidence.62 Conversely, if the polygraph succeeds in demon-
strating its reliability in assessing witness credibility, the Frye standard of
general scientific acceptance should be satisfied and the door properly
opened to the general admission of polygraph evidence for impeachment
purposes.
MICHAEL MORRIE JONES
Labor Law-Shopping Kart: The Need for a Broader Approach
to the Problems of Campaign Regulation
In accordance with its authority under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act to regulate union election campaigns,1 the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has developed a complex set of election standards to protect
employee "freedom of choice" 2 in voting for or against union representa-
tion. The Board conceives of free choice not simply as an uncoerced
refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. Cf. People v. Towns, 69 Mich. App. 475, 245
N.W.2d 97 (1976) (improper for trial court to induce defendant to take polygraph test prior t1
sentencing even though court told defendant that refusal to take the test would not affect the
sentence); People v. Allen, 49 Mich. App. 148, 211 N.W.2d 533 (1973) (improper to ask
defendant if he were willing to take a polygraph test).
62. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
1. Section 9(c)(1) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §
159(c)(1) (1970), states in part, "[If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a
question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the
results thereof." The Supreme Court interpreted a similar provision under § 9(c) of the National
Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 453 (1936), to give the Board authority to
promulgate regulations necessary to conduct a fair election. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316
U.S. 31, 37 (1942); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940).
2. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1962).
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